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The Constitutional Right to Travel:
Are Some Forms of Transportation More Equal Than Others?
Timothy Baldwin
“A rich man can choose to drive a limousine; a poor man may have to walk.” 1 So
declared the Ninth Circuit in 1972, when walking was a common phenomenon in the United
States. 2 Today, the overwhelming majority of Americans travel in a motor vehicle. 3 This
Comment will examine the implications of the institutional preference for motor vehicles, and
the categorical exclusion of other modes of transportation in many segments of the transportation
system. Interstate highways, for example, usually exclude all forms of traffic except motor
vehicles. 4 Many public roads have no sidewalks for pedestrians, and no special facilities to
accommodate bicyclists. 5 Few roads, particularly in suburban and rural communities, offer any
form of public transportation. 6

1

Monarch Travel Servs. v. Associated Cultural Clubs, 466 F.2d 552, 554 (9th Cir. 1972).

2

See, e.g., Ann M. Dellinger & Laurie Beck, How Risky Is the Commute to School? Deaths and Injuries by
Transportation Mode, TRANSP. RES. NEWS, Mar.-Apr. 2005, at 22, available at
http://trb.org/publications/trnews/trnews237commute.pdf (“In the early 1970s . . . an estimated 66% of children
walked to school.”).
3

See, e.g., CLARA RESCHOVSKY, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CENSUS 2000 BRIEF: JOURNEY TO WORK 2000 3 (2004),
available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2004pubs/c2kbr-33.pdf (finding that 88% of all commuters traveled to
work by motor vehicle in the year 2000).
4

Pedestrian and Bicycling Info. Ctr., FAQ's: Legal and Policy Issues,
http://www.bicyclinginfo.org/insight/faqs/legal_policy.htm#seventh (last visited Apr. 1, 2006).
5

THE GALLUP ORG., NAT'L SURV. OF PEDESTRIAN & BICYCLIST ATTITUDES & BEHAVS.: HIGHLIGHTS REPORT 5, 9
(2002), available at http://www.walkinginfo.org/pdf/FinalBikePedSurveyHighlightsReport_v2.pdf (finding that
bicycle lanes are available for 5% of bicycle trips, and one quarter of all pedestrian trips occur without a sidewalk or
shoulder available).
6

See, e.g., Surface Transp. Pol'y Project, Surface Transportation Policy Project Findings on the 2000 Census
Journey-to-Work Figures, http://www.transact.org/report.asp?id=190 (last visited Apr. 1, 2006) (finding that only
4% of America’s four million miles of roads are served by transit, either by bus or parallel train lines).
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Without an automobile, many individuals in the U.S. are left without a means to reach
their destination because they cannot drive. 7 Many others cannot afford to use a motor vehicle.
In the year 2000, the average annual cost to use a motor vehicle was $7363. 8 The poorest fifth of
American families pay forty-two percent of their income for the purchase, operation, and
maintenance of automobiles. 9 A famous cartoon illustrates the problem well -- a driver of a
motor vehicle turns to his passenger and says, “I hate driving . . . But I need a car to get to
work.” 10 Later that day, the driver sits at work in a cubicle. He turns to a co-worker and says, “I
hate my job, but I gotta make car payments.” 11
At face value, the governmental preference for motor vehicles does not create a cause of
action based on a constitutional right. 12 This Comment will explore the constitutional
ramifications of reduced access for non-motor vehicle travel, and focus on ways in which the
Constitution might provide relief non-motorized forms of transportation.
The major modes of transportation include private motor vehicles on highways
(consisting of interstates and other roads), public transit (including buses and trains), bicycling,
and walking. 13 The ability to travel using these transportation modes is one of the basic building

7

Surface Transp. Pol'y Project, Transportation and Social Equity,
http://www.transact.org/library/factsheets/equity.asp (last visited Apr. 1, 2006)(finding that one-third of all
Americans are either too young, too old, or infirm to drive).
8

In 2005, the average cost of operating a passenger motor vehicle in the United States was $8410. Press Release,
Am. Automobile Ass'n, Despite Higher Gas Prices, 2005 Driving Costs Nearly Unchanged from 2004, AAA Says
(Mar. 21, 2005), http://www.aaanewsroom.net/Main/Default.asp?CategoryID=4&ArticleID=361.

9

Surface Transp. Pol'y Project, supra note 7.

10

ANDY SINGER, CARTOONS 25 (2001).

11

Id.

12

See, e.g., Monarch Travel Servs. v. Associated Cultural Clubs, 466 F.2d 552, 554 (9th Cir. 1972) (explaining that
“[a] rich man can choose to drive a limousine; a poor man may have to walk. The poor man’s lack of choice in his
mode of travel may be unfortunate, but it is not unconstitutional.”).
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blocks of society. 14 Roads, bridges, and other forms of transportation infrastructure are
necessary for people to function in a modern community. 15 Visits to a bank, school, or anywhere
else utilize a form of transportation. A community without transportation infrastructure becomes
a community of inefficiency and chaos. 16 Thomas Harris McDonald, the father of the American
interstate road system, 17 once noted, “next to the education of the child, road building is the
greatest public responsibility.” 18
The preference for road building and motor vehicles dominates the American psyche 19
and receives support at the highest levels of U.S. government. In 2001, President George W.
Bush’s Press Secretary was asked whether Americans “may have to adopt limits on their
lifestyles as part of a national energy strategy.” 20 The Press Secretary responded, the President
"believes . . . that it should be the goal of policy makers to protect the American way of life. The
American way of life is a blessed one and we have a bounty of resources in this country. It's not
the presence of SUVs that has caused the problem." 21

13

See Bureau of Transp. Statistics, The Intermodal Transportation Database, http://www.transtats.bts.gov (last
visited Apr. 1, 2006) (some of the other defined modes include aviation, maritime, freight railroads, and pipelines).
14

See, e.g., 139 CONG. REC. E2037 (daily ed. Aug. 6, 1993) (statement of Rep. Sabo) (stating that support of
bicycling and walking “are essential to a viable intermodal transportation system.”).

15

See, e.g., 151 CONG. REC. H10913 (daily ed. Nov. 18, 2005) (statement of Rep. Diaz-Balart) (“It is well-known
that our transportation infrastructure is the backbone of the economy. Obviously, its continued strength is essential
to economic growth.”).

16

Cf. Faye Fiore, Gulf Coast Besieged: Opening the Road to Safety Not Easy: An Urban Exodus from Disaster
Generates Chaos for Cities that Can Barely Handle Daily Commutes, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 23, 2005, at A22.
17

See TOM LEWIS, DIVIDED HIGHWAYS 5 (2d ed. 1999).

18

Id. at 8.

19

See generally JANE HOLTZ KAY, ASPHALT NATION (1997).

20

Glen Johnson, Gas Prices Fuel Debate Over SUVS: Lawmakers May Demand Better Mileage, BOSTON GLOBE,
May 13, 2001, at A1.
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The dominance of the automobile as a policy choice of federal and state governments is
undeniable. 22 And yet, remarkably, American courts do not protect an individual’s right to use a
motor vehicle. 23 Courts have guarded the right to move freely, but they have not protected a
person’s ability to choose a method of transport. 24
This Comment will explore the laws that affect an individual’s ability to choose a
particular travel mode. It will review the implications of legal rules that hinder the use of nonmotorized transportation modes. The Comment is divided into four parts. Part I places the legal
discussion in context by describing the current problems with the transportation system, and by
providing an overview of the evolution of the American transportation system from its
beginnings to its present state. Part II reviews cases involving constitutional rights to interstate
travel and intrastate travel. 25 Legal developments in the right to travel between states, and within
one state, will provide insight into rights that might be attached to travel by a particular mode.
Part III addresses the countervailing trends in the development of legal rights from the

21

Id. “SUV” refers to a sport utility vehicle. In 2006, during his State of the Union Speech, President George W.
Bush may have modified policy when he stated that “America is addicted to oil.” See, e.g., Elisabeth Bumiller &
Adam Nagourney, Bush, Resetting Agenda, Says U.S. Must Cut Reliance On Oil, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2006, at A6.
However, if motor vehicles change energy sources, it does not logically follow that America’s reliance on them as a
form of transportation will decrease.
22

See KAY, supra note 19, at 270 (reporting that President Reagan called the private automobile the “last great
freedom,” and then went on to attack passenger trains).

23

See, e.g., Ducan v. Cone, No. 00-5705, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 33221 (6th Cir. Dec. 7, 2000) (finding there is no
fundamental right to drive a car); State v. Cox, 16 A.2d 508, 512 (N.H. 1940) (“The operation of an automobile
upon the public highways is not a right but only a privilege.”) (internal citations omitted), aff’d Cox v. New
Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941).
24

Cf. People v. Sweetser, 140 Cal. Rptr. 82, 85 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977) (“Although the members of the public have an
inalienable right to use public highways in a reasonable manner without obstruction and interruption, this right is
subject to the power of a county to impose reasonable regulations restricting the use of a county highway.”)
(citations omitted); State in re Hoffman v. Potomac Edison Co., 170 A. 568, 570 (Md. 1934) (“a [transportation] use
is usually held to be lawful and reasonable so long as it does not interfere with or endanger others lawfully and
reasonably engaged in the use of the way.”).
25

See generally Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999) (the Supreme Court’s most recent pronouncement on the right to
travel).
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perspective of transportation modes. While American courts have been quite unwilling to create
a constitutional right to drive an automobile, the Supreme Court seems protective of a “freedom
of movement” doctrine that protects an individual’s right to travel as a pedestrian. 26 Part IV
addresses the legal implications of the current transportation situation in the U.S. The Comment
concludes by arguing that a denial of access to the transportation system creates a cause of action
under the federal equal protection doctrine of “total deprivation” laid out in San Antonio
Independent School District v. Rodriquez. 27

PART I
A. The Transportation Problem
Transportation access directly affects many public policy issues. Excessive use of motor
vehicles damages the environment, reduces public health, and negatively influences land use
patterns and the supply of affordable housing. 28 Transportation access also has important
consequences for homeland security because it ensures freedom of movement for security
personnel responding to crises 29 and for individuals trying to flee disasters. 30

26

See generally Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 156 (1972); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 126
(1958).

27

San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez 411 U.S. 1, 23 (1973) (finding that “lack of personal resources has not
occasioned an absolute deprivation of the desired benefit” and is thus not a violation of equal protection).
28

See, e.g., Surface Transp. Pol'y Project, Transportation and Health,
http://www.transact.org/library/factsheets/health.asp (last visited Apr. 1, 2006); Surface Transp. Pol'y Project,
Transportation and Economic Prosperity, http://www.transact.org/library/factsheets/prosperity.asp (last visited Apr.
1, 2006).
29

See Robert D. McFadden, The Crash of Flight 587: Security; Lessons From Sept. 11 Are Followed in Quick
Transportation Shutdowns and Restarts, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13, 2001, at D8.

30

See, e.g., Jerry Adler, Ground Zero, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 24, 2001, at 72.
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The transportation problem in the U.S. will only worsen in the future. The interstate
highway system, as planned by the Federal Highway Administration, is largely built; 31 today,
fewer opportunities exist to build new roads or widen existing ones. With the overall number of
people and automobiles rising, 32 more Americans will be forced onto a stagnant supply of
transportation infrastructure. 33 As these conditions worsen, conflicts over land use and
transportation modes will become more frequent. 34 Interest groups will fight over scarcer
resources. 35 Under these conditions, alternative transportation users will likely find it difficult to
counteract the majoritarian tendencies of the motoring public.
One need look no further than New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina to understand the
importance of access to transportation. On August 29, 2005, Hurricane Katrina decimated New
Orleans. 36 Much of the city was built below sea level, and the hurricane destroyed nearby levees
and flooded the city. 37 Leading up to and after the hurricane, public officials tried unsuccessfully
to organize a massive evacuation effort, in part by encouraging residents to flee the city. 38 But
many people, mostly African American, 39 were simply too poor to leave New Orleans by car. 40
They needed a bus or another form of transportation to escape. 41
31

KAY, supra note 19, at 7.

32

See id. at 270-71.

33

See id. at 7, 14.

34

See id. at 14-15.

35

But cf. EDWARD BLAKELY, SHAPING THE AMERICAN DREAM: LAND USE CHOICES FOR AMERICA’S FUTURE 19-32
(1993).
36

See, e.g., John McQuaid, Alarm Sounded Too Late as N.O. Swamped, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), Sept. 8,
2005, at A10.
37

See, e.g., id.

38

See, e.g., James Dao, Lawmakers Question Louisiana Governor on Storm Response and Preparation, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 15, 2005, at A33.
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The dilemma facing the poor in New Orleans during Hurricane Katrina symbolizes the
larger transportation problem facing the poor in the U.S. They often bear the brunt of the
nation’s transportation problems. During the 1950s, the first major decade of interstate highway
construction in the U.S., over 350,000 homes were raised, and new highways were often placed
in poor communities. 42 Today, even though most individuals live near road networks, ninety
percent of former welfare recipients do not have access to a car. 43 Less than half of all jobs in
the U.S. are accessible by public transportation. 44 Poorer individuals like welfare recipients,
most of whom cannot or can only barely afford a car, are shut out from half of all jobs in the
country. 45 Compounding the problem, most cities do not provide public transportation during
the second and third shift jobs that tend to be available to the poor. 46 Unable to afford a car and
without any method of commuting to work, many welfare recipients are unable to find jobs. 47

39

See, e.g., Gregory Stanford, Poverty a Storm that Batters the Poor Every Day, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Sept. 11,
2005, at J4.

40

See, e.g., James B. Johnson, 3 Bay Area Residents Share Escape Stories, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 4, 2005, at A27.

41

See, e.g., Marc Sandalow, Katrina Thrusts Race and Poverty onto National Stage, S.F. CHRON., Sep. 23, 2005, at
A13.
42

Surface Transp. Pol'y Project, supra note 7.

43

Id.

44

Id.

45

Surface Transp. Pol'y Project, Transportation and Poverty Alleviation,
http://www.transact.org/library/factsheets/poverty.asp (last visited Apr. 1, 2006)(finding that three in every five jobs
suitable for welfare to work participants are not accessible by public transportation).
46

Id.

47

Id.
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On the other side of the coin, Americans above the poverty level 48 own more cars than
they used to, and are driving longer distances. 49 They have the ability to devote substantial
resources to automotive travel and can take advantage of the car-centric transportation system. 50
American courts generally consider restrictions on forms of travel lawful under a state’s
discretion to exercise its police power. 51 If a state deems it unsafe for a person to use a motor
vehicle, the state is within its power to revoke his or her driver’s license. 52 This general
authorization of a state’s police power, however, does not contemplate an increasingly likely
scenario -- what if a person does not own a car, and cannot afford a car? Further, what if there
are no forms of public transportation available for that person? If a state, through its police
power, can restrict an individual’s use of a motor vehicle, they can presumably restrict others
forms of transportation, such as walking and bicycling. 53 If a state uses its police power to
restrict bicycling and walking, a person without a motor vehicle may not be able to reach a job or
other important destinations.
In many cases, units of government do not need to pass regulations that explicitly restrict
alternative forms of travel. The design of the facility will be enough to deter usage by non48

The poverty line is the gross income below the standard threshold needed to acquire necessities for living. The
U.S. Census Bureau sets the poverty line for families and individuals depending upon age. For example, for a family
of two, both below the age of sixty-five, the 2003 poverty line was $12,649. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, POVERTY
THRESHOLDS 2004 (2005), available at http://www.census.gov/hhes/poverty/threshld/thresh04.html.
49

58.5 million households owned two automobiles in 2000, and eighteen million households owned three or more
vehicles. These figures are increases over previous U.S. Census reports. Surface Transp. Pol'y Project, supra note 6.

50

See KAY, supra note 19, at 120-23.

51

See, e.g., Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1 (1979) (finding that reasonable restrictions on travel, such as deterring
drunk driving, are constitutional under a state’s authority to exercise its regulatory powers).

52

Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105 (1977).

53

The Fifth Circuit has ruled that bicyclists do not have a cause of action under federal transportation law to
challenge agency actions for failure to consider bicycle safety in transportation projects. Lundeen v. Mineta, 291
F.3d 300, 310 (5th Cir. 2002) (finding that Congress “anticipated that the failure to consider specific factors in
planning a particular transportation project -- even bicycle safety -- would not be judicially reviewable.”).
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motorized transportation such that it becomes practically impossible to travel other than by
motor vehicle. Even if a road remains legally open to bicyclists and pedestrians, it may be very
unsafe if it is not designed for them. 54 Further compounding the problem, roads that fit civil
engineering guidelines 55 are often perceived as unsafe by alternative transportation users. 56
The “Green Book,” published by the American Association of State and Highway
Transportation Officials (AASHTO), is the pre-eminent civil engineering manual in the U.S. for
designing roads. 57 First published in 1956, it contains guidance on everything from the
appropriate width of a roadway to the proper placement of a drainage grates.58 Until 2001, the
stated mission of the AASHTO Green Book was “to provide operational efficiency, comfort,
safety, and convenience for the motorist." 59 As noted by one commentator, “the needs of

54

See, e.g., Mass. Bicycle Coalition, Policies, http://massbike.org/about/policies.htm#roads (last visited Apr. 1,
2006).

55

It is worth noting that significant disagreement exists about the definition of a safe facility for alternative
transportation, particularly in the bicycle community. For example, some bicycle experts believe that bicycle lanes
are the safest form of bicycle travel, while others believe that bicycle travel is most safely performed in the normal
roadway. See, e.g., WAYNE FEIN, CRITIQUE OF SHARED-USE FACILITIES FOR BICYCLES AND MOTOR VEHICLES 1
(2004), available at http://www.humantransport.org/bicycledriving/library/SharedUse_critique.pdf (taking the
position that there is insufficient evidence that bike lanes are safer than wide outside lanes). For those taking the
latter view, they often believe that the current road system is sufficient for safe bicycle use and see education as the
primary method of increasing bicycle mode safety. See generally JOHN FORRESTER, EFFECTIVE CYCLING 1 (6th ed.
1993). From a macro perspective, both sides are probably correct, in the sense that bicycle facilities are appropriate
in some contexts and inappropriate in others. In any event, most cyclists seem to support the creation of more
bicycle facilities. The Gallup Org., supra note 13, at 5 (finding that almost half of cyclists surveyed recommended
changes to the transportation system, and of those desiring changes, 73% wanted more bicycle facilities).
56

See FED. HIGHWAY ADMIN., 2005 TRAVELER OPINION AND PERCEPTION (TOP) SURVEY, DETAILED FINDING,
SAFETY (2005), available at http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/reports/traveleropinions/6.htm.
57

FED. HIGHWAY ADMIN., FLEXIBILITY IN HIGHWAY DESIGN, HIGHWAY DESIGN STANDARDS(1999), available at
http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/environment/flex/ch02.htm.

58

Id.

59

AM. ASS'N OF ST. AND HIGHWAY TRANSP. OFFICIALS, A POLICY ON GEOMETRIC DESIGN xliv (1994).
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pedestrians and bicyclists [in the Green Book], and the effects of roadway projects on the
environment and communities[,] are secondary.” 60
Available safety data strongly suggests that many roads are not safe for non-motorized
forms of transportation. 61 Roughly 5000 pedestrians and bicyclists are killed on the public
roadways each year, 62 but only 1.9% of available federal safety funds are spent on bicycle and
pedestrian safety annually. 63 By contrast, bicyclists and pedestrians account for over 13% of all
fatalities that occur on roadways. 64
The poor in the U.S. are left in a quandary. They cannot afford a car, and the state may
curtail their ability to use other transportation modes, sometimes intentionally. 65 Even if their
rights to use other modes are not curtailed, a strong probability exists that they do not think they

60

Stephen Burrington, Conservation Law Foundation, Take Back Your Streets(1998),
http://www.clf.org/general/index.asp?id=383. In the 2001 edition of the Green Book, AASHTO deleted the motorist
centered language from its mission statement, but the actual content of the manual remained largely the same from
the 1994 edition. Compare AM. ASS'N OF ST. AND HIGHWAY TRANSP. OFFICIALS, A POLICY ON GEOMETRIC DESIGN
(2001) with AM. ASS'N OF ST. AND HIGHWAY TRANSP. OFFICIALS, supra note 59.
61

See, e.g., NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMINISTRATION, TRAFFIC SAFETY FACTS 1 (2002), available at
http://www-nrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/pdf/nrd-30/NCSA/TSF2002/2002pcyfacts.pdf (finding that in 2002, 667 cyclists were
killed and 48,000 were injured). It is somewhat debatable whether the source of these crashes was poor design or
user behavior. See supra note 55.
62

Id. at 2.

63

America Bikes, Bicycle Pedestrian Fatality Data,
http://www.americabikes.org/images/resource/bicyclefriendly/completestreetsdata.pdf (last visited Apr. 1, 2006).
64

Id.

65

See, e.g., John Tuohy, IndyGo’s Passengers Don’t Fit in 1 Mold, Some Say Taking the Bus is Their Choice,
INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Jan. 29, 2004, at 1B (reporting that the local transit agency has intentionally under-funded its
transportation service since 1975).
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have safe facilities nearby to bicycle or walk. 66 Nor do they likely have reasonable access to
public transportation if they live anywhere outside of a large city. 67
Compounding the problem is the fact that many public transportation users are
minorities. “Nationally, public transportation users are disproportionately minorities with low to
moderate incomes.” 68 Minorities are hit hardest in cities, where “[A]frican Americans and
Latinos together comprise 54 percent of public transportation users . . . [nationally] just 7 percent
of white households do not own a car, compared with 24 percent of African American
households, 17 percent of Latino households, and 13 percent of Asian American households.” 69
Minority populations are hit harder when public transportation is not available. 70 Sidewalks and
other engineering solutions create a safe environment for alternative transportation. In many
cases, if safe facilities existed, it would be possible to travel by non-motorized transportation:
According to the 1995 Nationwide Personal Transportation
Survey, 25% of all trips are made within a mile of the home, 40%
of all trips are within two miles of the home, and 50% of the
working population commutes five miles or less to work - all
distances easily traveled by bike. Yet more than 82% of trips five
miles or less are made by personal motor vehicle. 71

66

See supra notes 55-56; BUREAU OF TRANSPORTATION STATISTICS, 2002 NATIONAL SURVEY OF PEDESTRIAN AND
BICYCLIST ATTITUDES AND BEHAVIORS 5 (2002), available at
http://www.walkinginfo.org/pdf/FinalBikePedSurveyHighlightsReport_v2.pdf.
67

See, e.g., Surface Transp. Pol’y Project, STPP Findings on the 2000 Census Journey-to0Work Figures,
http://www.transact.org/report.asp?id=190 (last visited Apr. 1, 2006) (finding that public transportation systems are
usually available in most larger American cities but not in suburbs).

68

THOMAS SANCHEZ ET AL., THE CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT AT HARVARD UNIVERSITY MOVING TO EQUITY:
ADDRESSING INEQUITABLE EFFECTS OF TRANSPORTATION POLICIES ON MINORITIES vii (2003), available at
http://www.civilrightsproject.harvard.edu/research/transportation/MovingtoEquity.pdf.
69

Id.

70

See Surface Transp. Pol’y Project, Transportation and Social Equity,
http://www.transact.org/library/factsheets/equity.asp (last visited Apr. 1, 2006).
71

Bicycle Friendly Community Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.bicyclefriendlycommunity.org/faqs.htm
(last visited Apr. 1, 2006).
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Despite the high cost of motor vehicles, 72 public transportation programs frequently
come under attack. 73 Motor vehicles themselves, however, are highly subsidized in the U.S. In
2002, local governments spent $27.9 billion on local roads (non-interstate roads), where most
pedestrian and bicycle travel occurs. 74 Roadway user charges covered only $3.1 billion of the
$27.9 billion tab. 75 Nationally, including bond financing, taxes and fees on motor vehicle usage
account for only 70% of all roadway expenditures; fuel taxes would need to rise 45% to cover all
roadway costs. 76
Non-motorized transportation infrastructure and programs do not always require large
sums of public funding. In the context of new land development, governments can use exactions
to make roadways more bicycle and pedestrian friendly.77 Additionally, bicycle and pedestrian
friendly design elements do not necessarily increase the cost of a roadway project. 78 In the
context of public transportation, removing people from cars and putting them onto buses, trains,

72

See supra note 8.

73

See, e.g., 151 CONG. REC. 1210 (2005) (statement of Rep. Cummings) (“Particularly during the last 5 years,
Amtrak has repeatedly faced threatened shutdowns and proposed elimination of its operating subsidy.”).

74

TODD LITMAN, WHOSE ROADS? 6 (Victorian Policy Institute 2004), available at http://www.vtpi.org/whoserd.pdf.

75

Id.

76

Id.

77

Cf. Dolan v. Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 395 (1994) (“Dedications for streets, sidewalks, and other public ways are
generally reasonable exactions to avoid excessive congestion from a proposed property use.”).

78

See, e.g., MASSACHUSETTS HIGHWAY DEPARTMENT, PROJECT DEVELOPMENT AND DESIGN GUIDE, 5-19 (2006),
available at http://www.vhb.com/mhdGuide/pdf/CH_5_a.pdf (“if motor vehicle speeds are too high, the designer
should consider selecting a lower motor vehicle design speed to increase the comfort and safety of the facility for
bicycles. Additionally, the designer could consider narrowing motor vehicle lanes to provide wider shoulders.”).
This guidance shows that civil engineers can take a limited amount of road and make it safer for bicyclists while still
allowing motor vehicles to travel safely.
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and boats mitigates hidden societal costs. 79 Some have argued that public transportation costs
are offset by reduced expenditures in other government sectors. 80
In the final analysis, travel in the U.S. is largely wedded to motor vehicle use, even if
American courts refuse to protect motorized travel as an individual right. 81 But how did we get
to this point in the first place? Automobiles, after all, were not produced in any quantity until the
turn of the twentieth century. 82 Examining the development of transportation infrastructure in
the U.S. will lend insight into the so-called constitutional rights to interstate travel, intrastate
travel, and freedom of movement.

B. A Short History of the Early Development of the American Transportation Infrastructure
In the early days of the American republic, zoning laws did not exist. 83 There was no
large railway system, and residential and commercial uses tended to be in close proximity to
each other. 84 “Until the mid-1800s, the practical distance for commuting was limited to the
range of a horse and coach.” 85

79

Cf. Clifford Cobb, The Roads Aren’t Free, CHALLENGE, May-June 1999, at 63-83.

80

See Sonja Ryst, Sector Spotlight: Public Good, Fiscal Risk: Mass Transit's Delicate Balance, THE BOND BUYER,
July 8, 1999, at 7.

81

See, e.g., Ducan v. Cone, No. 00-5705, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 33221 (6th Cir. filed Dec. 7, 2000) (finding that
there is no fundamental right to drive a car even when a car is the primary method of travel for society, as explained
in Miller v. Reed, 176 F.3d 1202 (9th Cir. 1999)).

82

RUSSELL BOURNE, AMERICAN ON THE MOVE: A HISTORY OF WATERWAYS, RAILWAYS, AND HIGHWAYS 112-17
(1995).

83

JAMES HOWARD KUNTSLER, THE GEOGRAPHY OF NOWHERE 34 (1993).

84

Id.

85

Id. at 46.
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As the industrial revolution grew in the 1800s, however, wealthy citizens began moving
out of the downtown core in urban areas. 86 Factories required large numbers of workers, and
large numbers of workers required massive amounts of housing in cities. 87 In New York City,
for example, the population grew from 696,115 in 1850 to 3,437,202 by 1900. 88 The advent of
the railroad enabled wealthier individuals to live farther away from the center of urban cities. 89
For example, in the mid to late 1800s, many of Chicago’s elite moved to Riverside, nine miles
away from downtown Chicago. 90 Each house in the neighborhood sat within ten minutes
walking distance from the train. 91 Eventually, Riverside developed into one of the first
“suburbs,” as commercial development sprung up to serve the new community. 92 This is one of
the first examples of “sprawl” that now dominates American land use. 93
Sprawl is the “[h]aphazard growth or extension outward, especially that resulting from
real estate development on the outskirts of a city.” 94 With the advent of sprawl, available jobs
move away from the center of cities to suburbs, making it more difficult for urban dwellers to

86

Id. at 55-57.

87

Id. at 60.

88

Id. at 36.

89

Id. at 55-57.

90

Id. at 50.

91

Id.

92

Id. at 51.

93

Id. (explaining that Riverside represented country living accessible to a city but removed from its problems, but
that it was a far cry from the suburbs created by the automobile culture); see generally KAY, supra note 19
(surveying the relationship between the automobile and sprawl).
94

AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1682 (4th ed. 2000).
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find employment. 95 Sprawl also has significant environmental and infrastructural costs, 96 and a
severe impact on the public health of residents living within sprawl areas. 97
Between 1890 and 1915, before sprawl was a common occurrence, the electric streetcar
and the motor vehicle came into wide use. 98 In the early years of the automotive industry,
streetcar companies did not receive large tax subsidies, while private automobile manufacturers
benefited from massive public expenditures in the form of road building. 99 Another form of
transportation, the bicycle, also came into wide use around this time. 100 Bicyclists needed
smooth surfaces to operate, and Albert Pope, the inventor of the modern bicycle, founded the
“Good Roads” movement: 101
By 1900, more than 300 companies were producing over a million
bicycles a year. Pope did not stop with manufacturing but turned
his attention to road conditions bicyclists had to endure. "American
roads are among the worst in the civilized world, and always have
been," he wrote in a pamphlet entitled Highway Improvement. "I
hope to live to see the time when all over our land, our cities,
towns, and villages shall be connected by as good roads as can be
found." Pope organized riders into an early lobbying group, The
League of American Wheelmen, financed courses in road
engineering at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and built
a short stretch of macadam road in Boston to give people an idea
how wonderful a smooth pavement could be. He helped persuade
the Commonwealth government of Massachusetts to create a

95

See Surface Transp. Pol’y Project, Transportation and Poverty Alleviation,
http://www.transact.org/library/factsheets/poverty.asp (last visited Apr. 1, 2006).
96

See, e.g., KAY, supra note 19, at 130-34.

97

See, e.g., Smart Growth America, Measuring the Health Effects of Sprawl (finding that communities with greater
sprawl cause residents to have more health problems), http://www.smartgrowthamerica.org/healthreportes.html (last
visited Apr. 1, 2006).

98

KUNTSLER, supra note 83, at 86-87.

99

Id. at 87.

100

LEWIS, supra note 17, at 7.

101

Id.
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highway commission. By the turn of the century, the "Good Roads"
movement was sweeping the country. The League of American
Wheelmen became the first highway lobby group that served as a
model for others to follow. Through its own publication, Good
Roads, the League supported "good roads" associations across the
country; it supported good roads conventions and argued
ceaselessly before state legislatures for road improvements. 102

As bicycling grew into a phenomenon in America, states and municipalities and
governments began enacting and enforcing safety laws. 103 Many municipalities banned bicycles
altogether because they scared horses. 104 State supreme courts almost uniformly upheld these
bans until the late 1880s. 105 The legal trend soon changed around the turn of the century,
however, and many courts afforded bicyclists legal rights. 106
The early bicycle rulings show that bicyclists were not only legally allowed to use roads
in the United States, but that they were expected to. 107 If bicyclists were not allowed to use the
roads, they would have been totally restricted from riding because they were banned from riding
on sidewalks. 108 Faced with such a harsh result, it is not surprising that state courts shied away
from a total denial of bicycle use throughout the transportation system.

102

Id. at 7-8.

103

Ross Petty, The Impact of the Sport of Bicycle Riding on the Safety Law, 35 AM. BUS. L.J. 185 (1998).

104

Id. at 193.

105

Id.

106

Id. at 195-96 (“ruling[s] giving cyclists equal rights on roadways soon became widely adopted . . . [one] decision
ruled that bicycle riders were not allowed to practice their sport on the sidewalk”) (internal citations omitted). By
not allowing bicyclists to ride on the sidewalk, the court required bicyclists to ride in the street like any other vehicle
and thus be considered part of the regular traffic flow.

107

Id. at 196.

108

Id. at 195-96.
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While bicycling was reaching the peak of its popularity, the automobile began its steady
ascent to the prominence it has enjoyed since the 1950s. 109 The automobile lobby initially
joined with Albert Pope’s “Good Roads” movement. 110 In 1893, the League of American
Wheelmen and Pope had convinced President Grover Cleveland’s staff to create a new “Office
of Road Inquiry,” in hopes of educating the public about the benefits of paved roads. 111 Around
this time, there were about three million miles of roads in America, but only three hundred fiftythousand miles of them had any kind of smooth surface. 112
Before paved streets become prevalent throughout the country, most Americans traveled
by foot, horse, water, or railroad; 113 and after the 1860s, many Americans also bicycled. 114 The
automobile industry benefited from the “Good Roads” lobbying efforts to pave roads, and
automobile registrations grew from 8,000 in 1900 to 469,000 by 1910. 115 By 1914, the “Office
of Road Inquiry,” originally intended to pave roads for bicyclists, became the Bureau of
Independent Roads. 116 By 1916, 3.5 million automobiles were in existence, 117 and the federal
government began appropriating large sums of funding for road building, although World War I
initially impeded construction efforts. 118 By 1930, the Federal Bureau of Public Roads had spent

109

LEWIS, supra note 17, at 23-24.

110

Id. at 8.

111

Id.

112

Id. at 10.

113

See generally BOURNE, supra note 83.

114

Petty, supra note 103, at 187.

115

LEWIS, supra note 17, at 10-11; KAY, supra note 19, at 142.

116

LEWIS, supra note 17, at 11.

117

Id.
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$750 million dollars and created the imprint of the national highway system that would follow
decades later. 119
The years 1900 to 1920 were also the golden age of streetcars in the United States. From
1890 to 1920, streetcar ridership increased from 2 to 15.5 million passengers annually. 120
During this period, local governments required streetcar companies to pay all of their operating
costs, while automobile companies were not required to subsidize road building. 121 The City of
Chicago, for example, “spent $340 million on road widening between 1910 and 1940.” 122
As vehicle production and road construction grew, so did the large trucking industry that
ultimately decimated the railroads. 123 Unlike the mature railroad industry, the trucking industry
went largely unregulated until 1935. 124 In 1915, the railroad industry had 1.8 million employees,
carried 1.5 million passengers, and moved over 2 million tons of freight. 125 Railroad companies
faltered, however, as federal highway funding continued to increase, ostensibly to “relieve
railroad congestion” by providing roads for trucks. 126 Congress and President Roosevelt spent
over $1.8 billion on road construction in the years leading up to World War II.127

118

LEWIS, supra note 17, at 11 (explaining that Congress appropriated seventy five million dollars to road building
in 1916, but only $500,000 was actually spent during the war).

119

Id. at 18.

120

KAY, supra note 19, at 142.

121

KUNTSLER, supra note 83, at 90.

122

Id.

123

LEWIS, supra note 17, at 21-22.

124

Id. at 21.

125

Id.

126

Id. at 22 (explaining that throughout the Great Depression, federal road building subsidies continued to increase,
which led to the rapid decline of railroads).
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Meanwhile, streetcar companies were under attack from automobile manufacturers.
Many governments required streetcar companies to guarantee a low fare in exchange for the
privilege to operate on public streets, and did not allow them to cease operations on unprofitable
routes. 128 Automobile manufacturers understood the weakened position of the streetcar
companies and acted. “The General Motors Corporation undertook a systemic campaign to put
streetcar lines out of business all over America . . . [by] using its financial muscle to buy up
streetcar lines, scrap the tracks, and convert the routes to buses.” 129 In 1949, a federal grand jury
indicted General Motors for criminal conspiracy; it emerged unscathed after paying a $5000
fine. 130
With railroad and streetcar companies out of the picture, automobile manufacturers had
no major competitors after World War II. 131 In 1956, President Dwight Eisenhower formed the
President’s Advisory Committee on a National Highway Program, and the Interstate Highway
System was born. 132 Between 1956 and 1991, the federal government spent about $50 billion a
year on road construction, funded largely by federal gasoline taxes. 133 The Interstate National
Highway System project eventually yielded 41,000 miles of new roads.
127

Id. at 22-23. In the 19th century, railroads also received subsidies from government before becoming highly
regulated. STEPHEN B. GODDARD, GETTING THERE: THE EPIC STRUGGLE BETWEEN ROAD AND RAIL IN THE
AMERICAN CENTURY 8-42 (1994). Many in the railroad industry at that time were also corrupt or engaged in
questionable business practices. See BOURNE, supra note 82, at 95-96, 107-09, 122.
128

KUNTSLER, supra note 83, at 90.

129

Id.

130

Id. at 92.

131

The story of the transportation infrastructure post World War II is both well known and well documented, and
there is no need to cover it in detail here. See, e.g., DAN MCNICHOL, THE ROADS THAT BUILT AMERICA, THE
INCREDIBLE STORY OF THE U.S. INTERSTATE SYSTEM (2005); WILLIAM KASZYNSKI, THE AMERICAN HIGHWAY: THE
HISTORY AND CULTURE OF ROADS IN THE UNITED STATES (2000); GODDARD, supra note 127, at 179-245; MARK H.
ROSE, INTERSTATE: EXPRESS HIGHWAY POLITICS 1939-1989.
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KAY, supra note 19, at 231.
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In 1991, Congress passed the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act, which
re-defined the federal government’s role in transportation policy. 134 Since 1991, the states have
played a larger role in allocating federal transportation dollars. 135 More funding has been
available for alternative forms of transportation such as bicycling and walking, 136 but the vast
majority of transportation funding continues to support motorized transportation on roadways. 137

Part II
A. The Constitutional Right to Interstate Travel

The Supreme Court has used the right to interstate travel to strike down residency
requirements for welfare benefits, 138 voting laws, 139 to protect an individual’s free movement
from interference by non-state actors, 140 and to prohibit a state from excluding indigents. 141 The

133

Id.

134

Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-240 (1991). Reauthorizations to the
original 1991 version were passed in 1997, 105 Pub. L. No. 178 (1997), and 2005, 109 Pub. L. No. 59 (2005). They
include minor changes, but the overall original structure is still intact. See generally Federal Highway
Administration, Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users (2005),
http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/safetealu/safetea-lu_summary.pdf.

135

The Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act required the states to implement long range transportation
plans and to create Metropolitan Planning Organizations that vote on the distribution of transportation funds. See
Federal Highway Administration, supra note 134.
136

Since 1991, about 1% of all federal transportation funds have been available for bicycling and walking – a
significant increase over pre-1991 levels. Id.; see also BIKES BELONG COALITION, GUIDE TO BICYCLE ADVOCACY 7
(1999), http://www.toolstudios.com/bikesbelong/Advocacy%20Guide.pdf.

137

See, e.g., SURFACE TRANSP. POL’Y PROJECT, THE TRANSPORTATION FUNDING LOOPHOLE (2002),
http://www.transact.org/library/decoder/ObligationLimit.pdf.
138

See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).

139

See, e.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972).

140

See, e.g., Attorney Gen. of New York v. Soto-Lopez, 470 U.S. 898 (1986).

141

See, e.g., Edwards v. Cal., 314 U.S. 160 (1941).
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main purpose of this section is to explain the various factual situations in which courts have
upheld a poor individual’s right to interstate travel. This overview will help inform the total
deprivation doctrine analysis described later in this Comment. 142
Federal case law and commentary make it clear that a constitutional right to travel
between states exists. 143 Various members of the Supreme Court have derived this right from
different constitutional sources. In Oregon v. Mitchell, Justice Harlan noted that the right to
interstate travel is a “nebulous judicial construct” that could not be found in any one particular
clause of the Constitution. 144 Other sources of the right to interstate travel have included the
Privileges and Immunities Clauses in Article IV 145 and the Fourteenth Amendment, 146 the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, 147 the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, 148 and the Commerce Clause in Article III, Section 8. 149
Article Four of the Articles of Confederation also addressed the privileges and
immunities of citizenship. The Articles version contained additional language not included in
the Constitution’s Privileges and Immunities Clause. 150 Article Four of the Articles of
Confederation reads:

142

See infra Part IV.

143

See, e.g., Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999); Jide Nzelibe, Free Movement: A Federalist Interpretation, 49 AM.
U.L. REV. 433 (1999); Sheldon Shapiro, Annotation: Federal Constitutional Right of Interstate Travel – Supreme
Court Cases, 27 L. ED. 2D 862 (2005).
144

Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 215 (Harlan, J., dissenting).

145

See, e.g., United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966).

146

See, e.g., Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112.

147

See, e.g., Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958).

148

See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).

149

See, e.g., Edwards v. Cal., 314 U.S. 160 (1969).
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The better to secure and perpetuate mutual friendship and
intercourse among the people of the different states in this union,
the free inhabitants of each of these states, paupers, vagabonds
and fugitives from Justice excepted, shall be entitled to all
privileges and immunities of free citizens in the several states,
and the people of each state shall have free ingress and regress to
and
from
any
other
state. 151
Article IV, Section 2 of the Constitution does not include the “free ingress and regress”
or the “paupers [and] vagabonds” language found in the Articles of Confederation. The
Constitution reads: “[t]he Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities
of Citizens in the several States.” 152 Many commentators have theorized that the framers
assumed the language used in the Articles of Confederation was obviously implicit in the
meaning of “Privileges and Immunities” and did not need to be included in the Constitution. 153
If the Articles of Confederation’s “Privileges and Immunities” clause was intended to be
incorporated into the Constitution, important implications follow. The Articles clause does not
extend the right to interstate travel to “paupers, vagabonds and fugitives.” 154 In today’s world,
paupers and vagabonds could mean those below the poverty line. Presumably, in 1781, when the
Articles of Confederation were passed, “paupers” and “vagabonds” applied to those traveling on
foot because they could not afford a horse or other form of transportation. Under the law of the
Articles, a state could thus deny entry to poor pedestrians. But as we will see later, while right to
travel jurisprudence does not defend a person’s right to travel using more expensive forms of

150

Nicole Hyland, Comment, On the Road Again: How Much Mileage is Left on the Privileges and Immunities
Clause and How Far Will It Travel?, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 187, 196 (2001).

151

ARTS. OF CONFEDERATION art. IV (1781).

152

U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2.

153

See, e.g., Nzelibe, supra note 143, at 439-40.

154

ARTS. OF CONFEDERATION art. IV (1781).
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transportation, it does generally protect the right to travel on foot. 155 The Court has even struck
down a law that punished individuals for helping indigents cross state lines. 156 These tendencies
seem to cut against the incorporation of the Articles of Confederation definition of “Privileges
and Immunities” into the Constitution. 157 This is an important point. If the Privileges and
Immunities Clause of Article IV and the Fourteenth Amendment are read to preclude extension
of the right to travel to paupers and vagabonds, the poor may not have an equal protection claim
under the Fourteenth Amendment. 158
Many of the Supreme Court’s cases that involve the right to interstate travel include fact
patterns that implicate distinct travel modes and the economic status of the travelers. 159 Most of
the situations in which the Court has invoked the right to interstate travel involve situations
where poorer members of society are likely to be impacted by a travel restriction. In Crandall v.
Nevada, decided in 1868, the Court invalidated a Nevada statute that allowed the state to tax
travelers one dollar as they entered or exited the state by railroad. 160 The Court rejected the law,
reasoning that “if the State can tax a railroad passenger one dollar, it can tax him one thousand

155

See infra notes 278-92 and accompanying text.

156

See, e.g., Edwards v. Cal., 314 U.S. 172 (1941) (striking down a state law that punished residents for aiding the
transport of indigents into the state).

157

Under a strict textualist definition, the Privilege and Immunities Clause in Article IV would not lead to a
restriction of travel for “paupers and vagabonds,” because those words do not appear in the Constitution. Nzelibe,
supra note 143, at 463. The “paupers and vagabonds” reference only appears in the Articles of Confederation
definition of Privilege and Immunities. See supra notes 150-152 and accompanying text.
158

See infra Part IV (discussing ways the poor can use equal protection to challenge state transportation policies). In
the Supreme Court’s most recent right to interstate travel decision, Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999), it grounded
one aspect of right to travel in the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and another
aspect in the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV of the Constitution.

159

See, e.g., Saenz, 526 U.S. 489; Mem’l Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974); Shapiro v. Thompson,
394 U.S. 618 (1969).

160

Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. 35 (1868); see also Edwards, 314 U.S. 172.
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dollars.” 161 The Court also seemed particularly concerned with keeping major transportation
routes open for the majority of citizenry. 162 The Crandall Court emphasized that “we are all
citizens of the United States, and as members of the same community must have the right to pass
and repass through every part of it without interruption.” 163 Specifically mentioning “all
citizens,” the Court implicitly included indigent passengers who presumably would have little
impact on the commerce or the prosperity of the individual states.
Beginning in 1969, the Supreme Court started striking down laws that denied benefits to
newer poor residents of states. States typically restricted benefits to newer residents by denying
services until the individuals satisfied durational residency requirements. 164 This line of cases is
important because it illustrates the “penalty” test the Court has used to assess factual situations
involving the poor and the right to travel.
In Shapiro v. Thompson, the Court struck down a law that denied welfare benefits to
residents until they had lived in the state for at least one year. 165 The Court reasoned that the
residency requirement amounted to an unconstitutional classification under the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Equal Protection clause. 166 The Shapiro decision held that “any classification

161

Crandall, 73 U.S. at 46.

162

Id. (noting that if the tax was upheld, then “one or more States covering the only practicable routes of travel . . .
may totally prevent or seriously burden all transportation of passengers from one part of the country to the other.”).

163

Id. at 49.

164

A large volume of commentary exists on the relationship between the right to interstate travel and welfare
benefits. See, e.g., Bryan H. Wildenthal, State Parochialism, the Right to Travel, and the Privileges and Immunities
Clause of Article IV, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1557 (1989); Calvert Chipcase, Note, Saenz v. Roe: The Right to Travel,
Durational Residency Requirements and a Misapplication of the Privileges and Immunities Clause, 23 HAWAII L.
REV. 685 (2001).
165

Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).

166

See id. at 634.
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which serves to penalize the exercise of [the right to interstate travel], unless shown to be
necessary to promote a compelling government interest, is unconstitutional. 167
Shapiro used the strict scrutiny test to review penalties that infringed on the right to
interstate travel. Strict scrutiny, in the context of the right to travel, means that the state action
must be “necessary to promote a compelling state interest.” 168 Absent strict scrutiny, state action
is usually reviewed under the lax rational basis standard of review. 169
In Dunn v. Blumstein, 170 the Court’s next major pronouncement on the right to travel and
the poor after Shapiro, 171 ”the Court clarified that the penalty factor promoted in Shapiro would
have to burden recent migrants in a discriminatory fashion.” 172 The Dunn case did not directly
involve a claim brought by low-income individuals. 173 The Court upheld the Shapiro strict
scrutiny test as the proper standard of review. 174 Importantly, for our purposes here, Dunn
reiterated that Shapiro strict scrutiny would be triggered by classifications that penalize the right
to travel. 175 Dunn also clarified that in welfare cases involving the right to travel, it would not
be important to show affirmative evidence that welfare recipients have in fact been deterred from

167

Id.

168

Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 342 (1972).

169

See infra note 308.

170

Dunn, 405 U.S. 330.

171

Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970), was decided between Shapiro and Dunn. It reviewed right to travel
penalties in the context of lowering the minimum voting age.

172

Nzelibe, supra note 143, at 454-55.

173

See Dunn, 405 U.S. at 331 (a professor at a university brought the equal protection claim in the case).

174

Id. at 339.

175

Id. at 340.
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traveling. 176 Rather, the Court noted that residency requirements penalize the right to travel by
potentially deterring travel, even if welfare recipients have not in fact attempted to move. 177
The Dunn decision ultimately held that durational residency requirements in the context of
voting rights violated the equal protection clause and did not survive strict scrutiny. 178
As one commentator has noted, after Dunn, the Supreme Court watered down the
standard of review to the point where the current test may be little more than an ad-hoc balancing
test. 179 In Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 180 the Supreme Court provided a more
specific definition of state actions that penalize the right to travel. 181 Memorial Hospital
addressed whether a state’s denial of medical care to an indigent based on durational residency
requirements infringed his right to travel. 182 The Memorial Hospital Court had a difficult time
defining what types of penalties would infringe on the right to travel and thus require strict
scrutiny. 183 Ultimately, Maricopa laid down a two-part test to help determine what constitutes a
penalty to the right to travel: (1) denial of fundamental political rights, and (2) denial of the basic
necessities of life. 184 The Court went on to describe the limits of the penalty analysis for basic
necessities of life:

176

See id.
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See id. at 340-41.

178

Id. at 360.

179

See generally Nzelibe, supra note 143, at 455, 458.

180

Mem’l Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 259 (1974).
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Nzelibe, supra note 143, at 455.
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Mem’l Hosp., 415 U.S. at 251, 254-55.
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Id. at 256-260.

184

Id. at 259.
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Whatever the ultimate parameters of the Shapiro penalty analysis, it is at least
clear that medical care is as much "a basic necessity of life" to an indigent as
welfare assistance. And, governmental privileges or benefits necessary to basic
sustenance have often been viewed as being of greater constitutional significance
than less essential forms of governmental entitlements. It would be odd, indeed,
to find that the [state] was required to afford [the plaintiff] welfare assistance to
keep him from the discomfort of inadequate housing or the pangs of hunger but
could deny him the medical care necessary to relieve him from the wheezing and
gasping for breath that attend his illness. 185
As Part IV explains, non-motor vehicle users could assert a claim similar to welfare or
health care classifications that warranted protection in Memorial Hospital. Under the Memorial
Hospital test, lack of transportation access penalizes the right to travel at least as much as denial
of access to welfare and health care benefits.
In cases after Memorial Hospital, the Court continued to struggle with defining what
constitutes a penalty to the right to travel. 186 Nevertheless, the determination that a penalty exists
remains a central factor in right to travel jurisprudence. 187 In Saenz v. Roe, the Court’s most
recent pronouncement on the right to travel, the court laid out three protections that the right to
interstate travel guarantees: (1) the right of a citizen to enter and leave another state, (2) the right
to be treated as a welcome visitor when temporarily present in a state, and (3) for travelers who
become new residents of a state, the right to be treated like other citizens of the state. 188 The
Saenz Court ruled that when a state actor makes a discriminatory classification, a partial denial
(instead of an outright denial) of benefits is enough to constitute a penalty. 189

185

Id. at 259-60 (internal citations omitted).

186

Nzelibe, supra note 143, at 455-60.

187

The court reasoned that “since the right to travel embraces the citizen’s right to be treated equally in her new
State of residence, the discriminatory classification is itself a penalty.” Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 505 (1999).

188

Id. at 500.

189

Id. at 504-05.
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Even in cases where poverty is not an explicit issue, the Supreme Court tends to protect
the transportation interests of poor people. In United States v. Guest, 190 for example, six white
individuals were charged with harassing African Americans as they attempted to travel within
and outside the state of Georgia.191 The defendants’ actions only indirectly implicated state
government action, but the Court still held that “the right of interstate travel is . . . a right secured
against interference from any source whatsoever, whether governmental or private.” 192
On its face, the Guest decision had nothing to do with poverty. Neither the majority
opinion, 193 the concurrence, 194 nor the dissent 195 mentioned the economic status of African
Americans living and traveling in Georgia. However, the majority opinion approvingly cited
Edwards v. California, 196 where the Court invalidated “a California law which impeded the free
interstate passage of the indigent,” and declared that the decision was “consistent with
precedents firmly establishing that the federal commerce power surely encompasses the
movement in interstate commerce of persons as well as commodities.” 197
The Guest decision indicates the Court’s willingness to protect the ability of the poor to
travel interstate. And it is not unreasonable to assume the Court clearly understood the different
socio-economic positions of whites and African Americans during the 1960s. In 1966, when the

190

United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966).

191

Id. at 746-748.

192

Id. at 759.

193

Id. at 746 (Stewart, J.).

194

Id. at 761 (Clark, J., concurring).

195

Id. at 762 (Harlan, J., dissenting).

196

Edwards v. Cal., 314 U.S. 172 (1941).

197

Guest, 383 U.S., at 758-59 (explaining that the Commerce Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, is one of the
sources from which the Supreme Court has traditionally derived the right to interstate travel).
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Court decided Guest, 41.8% of African Americans lived in poverty, compared to only 11.3% of
the white population. 198
In cases where the Court has suggested or held that the right to interstate travel is not
violated, the plaintiff has typically been able to afford expensive forms of transportation. This
line of jurisprudence suggests that newer, more costly forms of transportation are not entrenched
liberties that demand respect from courts as fundamental rights. 199 In Williams v. Fears, the
Court upheld a Georgia statute that taxed employers $500 when they hired out of state
laborers. 200 The Court based its decision on the premise that the tax did not directly impact the
right to travel of the laborers. 201 Only the employer was affected, and the laborers were still free
to travel in and out of the state at their own pleasure. 202 The Court emphasized that “the right of
locomotion, the right to remove from one place to another according to inclination, is an attribute
of personal liberty, and the right, ordinarily, of free transit from or through the territory of any
State is a right secured by . . . the Constitution.” 203 The Court rooted the right to interstate
travel, at the most fundamental level, as an attribute of personal liberty.
In one of the first right to travel cases involving motor vehicles, the Supreme Court ruled
in Hess v. Pawloski that states could put reasonable restrictions on motor vehicles using state

198

ELEANOR BAUGHER & LEATHA LAMISON WHITE, POVERTY IN THE U.S.: 1995, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE,
ECONOMIC AND STATISTICS ADMINISTRATION, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS C-3, C-4 (1995), available at
http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/poverty/prevcps/p60-194.pdf.
199

See infra Part IV. Under federal equal protection analysis, courts look more closely at state actions that implicate
the fundamental rights of citizens.
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Williams v. Fears, 179 U.S. 270 (1900).

201

Id. at 275.

202

Id.

203

Id. at 274.
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highways. 204 In Hess, an out of state resident hit an in-state resident. 205 While the Court noted
that a state clearly had the power to regulate the use of its own highways, the Court also put
special emphasis on the need to regulate the safety of motor vehicles on highways. 206 The Court
reasoned that before a non-resident motorist could operate a motor vehicle within the state, the
state could require her to appoint an official or agent within state on whom process must be
served in the event of an accident. 207
Other Supreme Court decisions have also restricted the rights of individuals to use more
expensive or dangerous transportation modes. For example, in Hendrick v. Maryland, the
District of Columbia required non-residents to register their cars before operating within city
limits. 208 The Court upheld the registration requirement as a reasonable use of the police power,
and noted that “the movement of motor vehicles over the highways is attended by constant and
serious dangers to the public, and is also abnormally destructive to the ways themselves.” 209 In
another case, the Court ruled that state taxes on airline passengers were not an inhibition on
interstate travel; rather, the taxes helped fund airport operations and benefited the public good. 210
In sum, while the ability to reasonably regulate interstate travel does not offend the right
to travel interstate, the Court has been much more willing to allow burdens on travel that affect

204

Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352, 356 (1927).

205

Id. at 353.

206

Id. at 356 (“Motor vehicles are dangerous machines, and, even when skillfully and carefully operated, their use is
attended by serious dangers to persons and property. In the public interest the state may make and enforce
regulations reasonably calculated to promote care on the part of all, residents and non-residents alike, who use its
highways.”).

207

Id. at 354.

208

Hendrick v. Maryland, 235 U.S. 610, 619 (1915).

209

Id. at 622.

210

Evansville-Vandenburgh Airport Auth. Dist. v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 405 U.S. 707 (1972).
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individuals who can afford other means of travel. 211 When the plaintiffs are either poor or
indigent, the Court has been willing to find a constitutional violation of the right to interstate
travel. 212

B. The Constitutional Right to Intrastate Travel.

Similar to the discussion of the right to interstate travel, there is no shortage of literature
that addresses the existence and implications of intrastate travel. 213 There is thus no need to
delve into a general review of the topic. Intrastate travel refers to journeys that occur solely
within one state. The right to intrastate travel is important because it helps define the contours of
the rights of non-motor vehicle travelers. 214 Alternative transportation users would enjoy more
constitutional projection if a court recognizes and protects intrastate travel. 215
Contrary to interstate travel jurisprudence, the Court has explicitly decided not to decide
whether a constitutional right to intrastate travel exists. In 1974, the Court decided Memorial
Hospital v. Maricopa County, and declared, “[a] constitutional distinction between interstate and
211

The more dangerous or risky the form of transportation, the more likely the Supreme Court seems willing to
regulate it. See Hess v. Pawloksi, supra note 204, at 40-41 (finding that the automobile is dangerous and should be
regulated as a mode of travel).

212

As one commentator has noted, the “contours [of the right to travel] are blurry and ill-defined.” Nzelibe, supra
note 143, at 463. Nzelibe theorizes that “the claim of a right to travel provided a judicial vehicle for righting the
wrong of legislative apathy towards the poor by the states--a judicial power that otherwise was limited by [other
cases denying the poor constitutional rights such as housing and education].” Id.
213

See, e.g., Bruce Epperson, Permitted But Not Intended: Boub v. Township of Wayne, Municipal Tort Immunity in
Illinois, and the Right to Local Travel, 38 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 545 (2004); Matthew Dombrowski, Comment,
Securing Access for the Urban Poor, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 503 (2005); Nicole Hyland, Comment, On the Road
Again: How Much Mileage is Left on the Privileges and Immunities Clause and How Far Will It Travel?, 70
FORDHAM L. REV. 187 (2001); Andrew Porter, Comment, Toward a Constitutional Analysis of the Right to
Intrastate Travel, 86 NW. U.L. REV. 820 (1992).
214

Recall that the right to interstate travel protects three types of privileges. See supra note 189.

215

See infra Part IV.
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intrastate travel, [is] a question we do not now consider.” 216 Since then, the Court has remained
silent on the issue. 217
In the absence of a definitive ruling from the Supreme Court, federal appellate courts
have split on the issue of the existence of a right to intrastate travel. 218 Despite this circuit split,
the federal appellate decisions have followed a similar trend to the Supreme Court’s
jurisprudence involving the right to interstate travel. When viewed through the lens of the
economic status of the traveler, the circuit decisions follow a discernible pattern. 219 One outlier
circuit exists -- the Third Circuit -- and it will be discussed at the end of this section. 220
In the circuits that recognize a right to intrastate travel, case law looks sympathetically at
the economic and social class of the individual affected by the restriction. In Johnson v. City of
Cincinnati, the Sixth Circuit recognized the right to intrastate travel. 221 The plaintiffs were
barred by local ordinance from an area of the city because of past criminal convictions. 222
Because of the travel restriction, one of the plaintiffs, a homeless man, could not visit his
lawyer’s office because it was in the restricted zone. 223 The other plaintiff was a grandmother
who could not legally visit her grandchildren after she was banned from the geographic area. 224

216

Mem’l Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 255-56 (1974).

217

Doe v. Miller, 405 F.3d 700, 712 (8th Cir. 2005).

218

Id. at 712-13.

219

See infra pp. 44-48.

220

See Lutz v. City of York, 899 F.2d 255 (3d Cir. 1990).

221

Johnson v. City of Cincinnati, 310 F.3d 484, 487 (6th Cir. 2002).

222

Id.

223

Id. at 505.

224

Id. at 503.
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The grandmother needed to travel to the grandchildren’s home to help raise them and take them
to school. 225 The Sixth Circuit rejected the ban, finding that “due process . . . demands some
individualized consideration before an individual’s right to localized travel can be restricted.” 226
The court was particularly concerned that the travel restriction denied the plaintiffs access to
basic needs like food, shelter, and social and educational services. 227
In King v. New Rochelle Municipal Housing Authority, the Second Circuit recognized the
right to intrastate travel in a case involving housing and welfare recipients. 228 The local housing
authority issued a rule that required individuals to reside in the state for five continuous years
before becoming eligible for public housing. 229 All of the plaintiffs affected in the case
supported families, and at least two of the three plaintiffs received public assistance. 230 The
court reinforced the right to intrastate travel in strong terms, reasoning that “it would be
meaningless to describe the right to travel between states as a fundamental precept of personal
liberty and not to acknowledge a correlative constitutional right to travel within a state.” 231 The
court also noted that the residency restriction penalized the new residents as a class by forcing
them to wait longer than their in-state peers. 232

225

Id.

226

Id. at 504.

227

Id. at 503.

228

King v. New Rochelle Mun. Hous. Auth., 442 F.2d 646 (2d Cir. 1971).

229

Id. at 647.

230

Id.

231

Id. at 648.

232

Id.
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In the circuits that hold no right to intrastate travel exists, the individuals affected in the
cases tend to be either from a higher income bracket or considered less worthy of protection. In
Wright v. City of Jackson, for example, the Fifth Circuit upheld a city ordinance requiring that all
city employees reside within city limits. 233 The court ruled the ordinance was related to a
legitimate government purpose, and that there was no “fundamental ‘right to commute.’” 234
Sex offenders do not fare any better with courts that reject the right to intrastate travel. In
Doe v. City of Lafayette, the Seventh Circuit held that a sex offender ban in public parks did not
give rise to a right to intrastate travel claim. 235 The court defined any supposed intrastate travel
right narrowly – by considering whether or not the right to enter a public park was “implicit in
the concept of ordered liberty.” 236 In Doe v. Miller, the Eighth Circuit pursued similar reasoning
to Lafayette, holding that a restriction of sex offenders living near schools did not implicate any
potential right to intrastate travel.237
In Miller, the court ruled that the state statute did not prevent a sex offender from
entering or leaving any part of the state (including travel near schools), and that the statute did
not erect a barrier to intrastate movement. 238 The Eighth Circuit also noted that “the decisions
finding infringement of a fundamental right to intrastate travel have involved laws that trigger

233

Wright v. City of Jackson, 506 F.2d 900, 901 (5th Cir. 1976).

234

Id. at 902; see also Andre v. Bd. of Trs. of Maywood, 561 F.2d 48 (7th Cir. 1977).

235

Doe v. City of Lafayette, 377 F.3d 757 (7th Cir. 2004).

236

Id. at 771-74. Perhaps the court defined the right narrowly because the law regulated a morally reprehensible
group – sex offenders. In Bowers v. Hardwick, the Supreme Court also narrowly defined a right against what it
probably considered a morally reprehensible group – homosexuals. Bowers v. Hardwick, 47 U.S. 186 (1986). In
Bowers, the Court ruled there was no constitutional right to the narrow issue sodomy, id. at 189, when it probably
could have based its decision on the more broad constitutional right to privacy. Id. at 205-06 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
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Doe v. Miller, 405 F.3d 700 (8th Cir. 2005).

238

Id. at 713.
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concerns not present here – interference with free ingress to and egress from certain parts of a
State, or treatment of new residents of a locality less favorably than existing residents.” 239
The Eighth Circuit seemed to reason that sex offenders still have the liberty to travel
anywhere in the state, even if they are prohibited from living near schools. On one level, the
Eighth Circuit’s reasoning in Miller directly conflicts with the Supreme Court’s interstate travel
welfare benefits jurisprudence. 240 The welfare cases hold that residency restrictions that restrict
access to benefits are unconstitutional violations of the right to travel. 241 The law that prohibited
sex offenders from living near schools could also be seen as a penalty that restricts access the
privilege of choosing one’s home. The Eighth Circuit probably saw sex offenders as a very
different class than poor individuals needing economic assistance, and drew a distinction
between a privilege and a benefit.
The Third Circuit takes a unique approach to the right to intrastate travel, and in many
ways it represents a compromise in the current circuit split. In Lutz v. City of York, the court
delved into a detailed search for a constitutional source to the right of intrastate travel. 242 The
case turned on the constitutionality of a “cruising” ordinance that prohibited driving a motor
vehicle repeatedly in a loop at certain hours of the day. 243 The plaintiff challenged the law as
facially invalid because it violated the right to intrastate travel. 244 The court first reviewed the
source of the constitutional right to intrastate travel, and ultimately settled on substantive due
239

Id. (internal citations omitted).

240

See supra pp. 33-38.

241

Id.

242

Lutz v. City of York, 899 F.2d 255 (3d Cir. 1990).
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Id. at 257 (the ordinance at issue restricted passing the same point twice between 7:00 p.m. and 3:30 a.m. during
any two hour period).

244

Id. at 261.
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process inherent in the Fifth Amendment. 245 The Third Circuit concluded that “the right to
move freely about one’s neighborhood or town, even by automobile, is indeed ‘implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty’ and ‘deeply rooted in the Nation’s history.’” 246 The Lutz court also
made the cryptic statement that:
The right or tradition we consider may be described as the right to
travel locally through public spaces and roadways. Under [the
City of] York's view, a state or local government could
constitutionally prohibit all freedom of movement that does not
involve interstate migration, interstate commerce, business
between a citizen and the federal government, and (presumably)
travel incident to otherwise protected activity. Conceivably this
result could be made less implausible by attempting to distinguish
a more particularized, protected tradition of travel or wandering
on foot . . . from an unprotected tradition of localized travel by
automobile. But accepting that distinction would imply the
constitutionality of the limited travel ban described above,
enforced exclusively by state control of the public roadways. It
would permit, for example, the prohibition of simply "going for a
ride" through one's neighborhood, so long as the prohibition
could be effected without burdening the protected forms of travel
and justified by any legitimate state purpose it conceivably
furthered. 247
The court’s comments suggest the Third Circuit would protect all forms of transportation
from regulations that burden intrastate travel. The court also seemed to acknowledge that there
may indeed be a constitutionally protected right to walk, and it arguably extended this
constitutional right to include a protected interest in driving a car. However, the implications of
recognizing such a right would be enormous, and go against Supreme Court precedent allowing
the restriction of travel modes. 248
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Id. at 258-68.
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In the end, the Third Circuit found a way to uphold the cruising ordinance in Lutz. 249
Borrowing from First Amendment jurisprudence, the court created a new intermediate scrutiny
review test to analyze the substantive due process right to drive an automobile. 250 The court then
applied the new test and upheld the city ordinance, finding that the City of York had a significant
interest in ensuring public safety and reducing congestion. 251 But, as we will soon see, the Lutz
court’s reasoning went against established precedent that disfavors the automobile as a
transportation mode. The Lutz decision falls into the netherworld of jurisprudence between the
constitutional right to “freedom of association” 252 and cases that do not guarantee a right to use a
particular travel mode. 253

Part III

A. The Strong Presumption Against Choice of Transportation Mode.

The presumption against choice of transportation mode in right to travel jurisprudence
began with Monarch Travel Services v. Associated Cultural Clubs. 254 In Monarch, the Ninth

248

See, e.g., Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105 (1977) (finding that it is within the state’s police power to revoke a
driver’s license and refuse an individual’s right to drive).
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Lutz v. York, 899 F.2d 255, 270 (3d. Cir. 1990).
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Id. at 268-70.
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Id. at 270.
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See infra Part III.B.
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At least one court has used Lutz as precedent in analyzing the right to travel as a fundamental right subject to
intermediate scrutiny. See Townes v. City of St. Louis, 949 F. Supp. 731 (E.D. Mo. 1996).
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Circuit reviewed a statute that regulated air carriers. 255 The defendant in the case argued that the
regulations led to higher ticket prices, and that not everyone could afford to pay the higher prices
to travel to Europe. 256 In the defendant’s view, the regulation violated the constitutional right to
travel. 257
The Monarch court ruled that higher prices caused by the regulations did not violate the
right to travel. 258 The court reasoned, “higher air tariffs will limit travel of those who cannot pay
the price. A rich man can choose to drive a limousine; a poor man may have to walk. The poor
man's lack of choice in his mode of travel may be unfortunate, but it is not unconstitutional.” 259
Of course, the court left out the point that it is literally impossible to walk to Europe.
Shanks v. Forsyth County Park Authority is another example rejecting protection of a
particular travel mode. 260 The Shanks court reviewed the constitutionality of a statute that
banned motorcycles from a park. 261 Even while assuming that the right to intrastate travel
existed, the court found that the ban did not affect a travel right because it only regulated a
particular method of travel. 262 The court reasoned, “[p]eople are free to travel inside the Park
through other methods of travel such as by foot, car, bicycle, etc. As such, the ban on
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Id. at 553-54.
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Id. at 554.
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motorcycles does not impede a person’s right to travel but merely regulates the method of travel
once inside the Park.” 263
Other courts have almost uniformly rejected an implied right to choose a transportation
mode in right to travel cases, and most cite to Monarch or its companion case in the Ninth
Circuit, Miller v. Reed. 264 However, reliance by other courts on Monarch and Miller for a
blanket restriction in choosing a transportation mode goes too far. Monarch addressed a fact
situation involving airplanes that traveled internationally. 265 As such, it implicated the right to
international travel, not the right to travel interstate or intrastate. The Supreme Court has
consistently held international travel to different standards than travel within the United
States. 266
In Miller, the Ninth Circuit held that the plaintiff did not have a fundamental “right to
drive” an automobile, and that a state could constitutionally revoke a driver’s license. 267 The
court also noted that “we have previously held that burdens on a single mode of transportation do
not implicate the right to interstate travel.” 268 In support of its reasoning, in addition to citing

263

Id.

264

Miller v. Reed, 176 F.3d 1202 (9th Cir. 1999). Some of the cases that cite Miller or Monarch include Ducan v.
Cone, No. 00-5705, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 33221 (6th Cir. filed Dec. 7, 2000) (finding that there is no fundamental
right to drive a car); Avery v. Perrsyburg Mun. Court Prosecutor, No. 05-7246, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13433 (N.D.
Ohio 2005 filed Jul. 6 2005) (holding that restrictions on a single mode of transportation do not rise to the level of a
violation of the fundamental right to interstate travel); Tutor v. City of Hailey, No. 02-475-S-BLW, 2004 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 28354 (D. Idaho 2005 filed Apr. 6, 2005) (holding there is no right to travel by private jet).
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Monarch Travel Servs. v. Associated Cultural Clubs, 466 F.2d 552, 553 (9th Cir. 1972).
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See, e.g., Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280 (1981) (reasoning that international travel implicates national security
issues and should be measured under a different standard than the right to interstate travel); Califano v. Aznavorian,
439 U.S. 170 (1978) (finding that statutes that implicated the right to international travel cannot be reviewed under
the same constitutional standard as statutes that implicate the right to interstate travel).
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Miller v. Reed, 176 F.3d 1202, 1206 (9th Cir. 1999).
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Id. at 1205.
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Monarch, the Miller court relied upon two other cases – City of Houston v. FAA 269 and
Berberian v. Petit. 270
City of Houston reviewed an airport travel restriction that prevented airplanes from flying
particular routes. 271 The court rejected the argument that the restriction burdened the right to
travel, noting “[the] argument reduces to the feeble claim that passengers have a constitutional
right to the most convenient form of travel. That notion, as any experienced traveler can attest,
finds no support whatsoever [in case law].” 272
In Berberian, the court ruled:
The plaintiff's argument that the right to operate a motor vehicle
is fundamental because of its relation to the fundamental right of
interstate travel is utterly frivolous. The plaintiff is not being
prevented from traveling interstate by public transportation, by
common carrier, or in motor vehicle driven by someone with a
license to drive it. What is at issue here is not his right to travel
interstate, but his right to operate a motor vehicle on the public
highways, and we have no hesitation in holding that this is not a
fundamental right. 273
The Berberian and City of Houston decisions drive home the point that an individual
does not have a right to the most convenient form of travel. But they do not address the situation
in which there is only one method of reaching a destination. In Berberian, the court went so far
as to specifically mention that it might rule differently if the case involved public transportation,

269

City of Houston v. FAA, 679 F.2d 1184 (5th Cir. 1982).

270

Berberian v. Petit, 374 A.2d 791 (R.I. 1977).
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City of Houston v. FAA, 679 F.2d 1184, 1194 (5th Cir. 1982).
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Id. at 1198.
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Berberian v. Petit, 372 A.2d 791, 794 (R.I. 1977) (internal citations omitted) (cited in Miller v. Reed, 176 F.3d
1202, 1206 (9th Cir. 1999)).
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instead of a private automobile. 274 The Miller case involved a private automobile, and Monarch
implicated international airplane travel. In short, the facts in these cases, unlike the facts in the
Supreme Court’s interstate travel jurisprudence, do not involve situations in which the people are
unable to choose another travel mode within the United States.

B. Supreme Court Freedom of Movement Jurisprudence

Unlike the lower court cases that find no protected interest in choosing a transportation
mode, 275 Supreme Court cases that invoke the freedom of movement nearly always involve
personal liberty. 276 Federal appellate courts, when not looking explicitly at a particular
transportation mode, have also recognized a freedom of movement. 277 The Court has defined
freedom of movement as the right to free movement inside a nation’s frontiers, and it seems to
include the right to remain in a public place on foot. 278 The Supreme Court has never explicitly
recognized freedom of movement as an explicit fundamental right, 279 and federal appellate
courts are currently split over whether or not such a right exists. 280
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Berberian v. Petit, 372 A.2d 791, 794 (R.I. 1977).

275

See supra Part III.A.
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See, e.g., Williams v. Fears, 179 U.S. 270, 274 (1900) (“The right to remove from one place to another according
to inclination . . . is an attribute of personal liberty”) (cited in Johnson v. City of Cincinnati, 310 F.3d 484, 497 (6th
Cir. 2002)).
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See, e.g., Gomez v. Turner, 672 F.2d 134, 143-44 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (“walk[ing] the streets, without explanation or
formal papers is surely among the cherished liberties that distinguish this nation from so many others”).

278

See Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 54 (1999).
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Hutchins v. District of Columbia, 188 F.3d 531, 535-39 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
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Compare Johnson v. City of Cincinnati, 310 F.3d 484 (6th Cir. 2002) with Hutchins v. Dist. of Columbia, 188
F.3d 531 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
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Nevertheless, Supreme Court cases strongly suggest that, at the very least, a fundamental
right to travel on foot exists. In Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, the Court struck down a
vagrancy statute in which two individuals were arrested while walking down a sidewalk. 281
Justice Douglas, writing for the majority, described walking as a basic “amenit[y] of life,” 282 and
quoted Henry David Thoreau for the proposition that “every walk is a sort of crusade, preached
by some Peter the Hermit in us, to go forth and reconquer this Holy Land from the hands of the
Infidels.” 283 Justice Douglas’s language is not what one reads in the garden variety Supreme
Court decision, but the implications are unmistakable. Justice Douglas thought it was important
to protect walking, even if it is “not mentioned in the Constitution or in the Bill of Rights.” 284
In Kolender v. Lawson, the Court also protected an individual’s right to walk. 285
Kolender involved a statute that allowed police to stop any person walking on the street and ask
for identification. 286 The Court struck down the statute, reasoning that the right to walk the
public streets implicated freedom of movement. 287
In its freedom of movement jurisprudence, the Supreme Court has also addressed the
ability of individuals to maintain a livelihood. In Kent v. Dulles, the court said, “[f]reedom of
movement across frontiers in either direction, and inside frontiers as well, was a part of our
heritage . . .[T]ravel within a country, may be necessary for a livelihood. It may be as close to
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Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972).
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Id. at 164.

283

Id.

284

Id.

285

Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (1983).
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right to freedom of movement.”) (internal citations omitted).
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the heart of the individual as the choice of what he eats, or wears, or reads. Freedom of
movement is basic in our scheme of values.”288 However, it is important to note that Kent and
its successor case, Aptheker v. Secretary of State, both involved international travel. Also, most
of the Justices’ reasoning discussing freedom of association resides in dictum. 289
Further complicating the situation is the Supreme Court’s long line of jurisprudence
upholding a state’s power to regulate use of its public roads. 290 Lower courts have vigorously
upheld a state’s right to impose regulations that ostensibly make roads safer. 291 Lower courts
also allow regulations that limit individuals’ behavior while using transportation modes, such as
rules that require motorcyclists to wear helmets. 292

Part IV – Analysis and Conclusion

In the final analysis, federal case law is in conflict with itself. The Supreme Court and
lower courts protect interstate and intrastate travel when cases include factual situations that
affect the poorer members of society. 293 The right to walk, in particular, receives strong support
in the Supreme Court’s amorphous freedom of movement doctrine. 294 But, lower courts have
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Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 126 (1958); see also Aptheker v. Sec’y of State, 378 U.S. 500, 505-06 (1964).
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Kent, 357 U.S. 116; Aptheker, 378 U.S. 500 (both cases review the denial of passports based on political belief).
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repeatedly and unanimously rejected the right of an individual to choose one particular travel
mode. 295
The poor person, especially in today’s transportation environment, is left in a quandary.
In Monarch, the Ninth Circuit justified its rejection of a right to select a travel mode by stating
that if a person cannot afford another mode, 296 “[the] poor man may have to walk.” 297 But
public transportation frequently does not serve areas where new jobs are created, and today’s
transportation infrastructure makes it difficult or unsafe to walk (or bicycle) on much of the
transportation system. 298
In interstate travel and freedom of movement jurisprudence, the Supreme Court seems
most concerned with removing restrictions on personal liberty. 299 In intrastate travel
jurisprudence, the Supreme Court has not yet spoken definitively on the issue, and the circuit
courts are split. 300 But most circuit courts, even in the cryptic Lutz decision, seem to recognize
that transportation access for basic services is protected under the Constitution. 301 In future right
to travel cases, judges will have to reconcile a poor person’s theoretical liberty to move within
and across states with the fact that many living in poverty have no access to basic services and
jobs because they are unable to afford a car. 302
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Before the rise of modern roadway engineering and the automobile, alternative travel
modes were popular. Individuals from all socio-economic backgrounds were able to move
throughout the country. 303 Bicycling, walking, and public transportation were all viable modes
of transportation. 304 Since the Great Depression, however, the United States has become
increasingly reliant on the automobile for transportation. Today, in many areas of the country, it
is practically impossible to reach a destination with any form of transportation other than an
automobile. 305
Perhaps the most promising legal doctrine to protect the travel rights of poor individuals
is the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 306 In Plyler v. Doe, the Supreme
Court reaffirmed the principle that the Equal Protection Clause requires that all persons in
similar circumstances should be treated alike. 307 The Plyler Court noted that, ”[i]n applying the
Equal Protection Clause to most forms of state action, [the Court] seek[s] only the assurance that
the classification at issue bears some fair relationship to a legitimate state purpose.” 308
However, the Plyler Court went on to remark:
But we would not be faithful to our obligations under the Fourteenth
Amendment if we applied so deferential a standard to every
classification. The Equal Protection Clause was intended as a
restriction on state legislative action inconsistent with elemental
constitutional premises. Thus we have treated as presumptively
invidious those classifications that disadvantage a "suspect class," or
that impinge upon the exercise of a "fundamental right." With respect
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to such classifications, it is appropriate to enforce the mandate of
equal protection by requiring the State to demonstrate that its
classification has been precisely tailored to serve a compelling
governmental interest. In addition, we have recognized that certain
forms of legislative classification, while not facially invidious,
nonetheless give rise to recurring constitutional difficulties; in these
limited circumstances we have sought the assurance that the
classification reflects a reasoned judgment consistent with the ideal of
equal protection by inquiring whether it may fairly be viewed as
furthering a substantial interest of the State. 309
Right to travel cases involving the poor have often implicated the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause. While “the right to travel jurisprudence is somewhat
muddled,” 310 the “Supreme Court has stated . . . [that] in reality, right to travel analysis refers to
little more than a particular application of equal protection analysis.” 311 The Equal Protection
Clause does not create the right to interstate or intrastate travel. 312 Rather, it is a method of relief
for state actions that infringe on the right to travel. 313
Under federal equal protection doctrine, state actions that impede an individual’s ability
to travel receive judicial review under the rational basis test or some higher form of judicial
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scrutiny. 314 Courts analyze equal protection claims under strict scrutiny if state action involves a
fundamental right or a suspect class. 315
Most laws, regulations, and other state actions relating to transportation are facially
neutral because they do not explicitly single out one group. The only conceivable facial
classification would probably claim that state action favors automobile drivers over other
transportation users; but this is hardly within the realm of what the Supreme Court would
consider a suspect classification. 316 However, state action involving transportation almost
certainly involves interstate or intrastate travel, and could presumably penalize travel implicated
as a fundamental right. 317
The non-motor-vehicle user has a colorable claim using a fundamental rights approach
under the Fourteenth Amendment. Generally, in cases involving fundamental rights, the plaintiff
does not need to show that she is part of a suspect class. 318 But in right to travel cases, “[e]qual
protection focuses on whether there is disparity in treatment among a class of individuals on the
basis of the exercise of a fundamental right.” 319 The relevant inquiry is whether the citizen’s
right to travel has been penalized. 320 One of the ways in which state action penalizes the right to
travel occurs when a state’s classification denies a basic necessity of life. 321
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A right to travel claim based on lack of transportation access is unlikely to succeed as a
stand-alone claim, even though most Americans travel daily to accomplish all sorts of tasks. 322
One commentator, Jide Nzelibe, has convincingly pointed out that the Supreme Court’s right to
travel jurisprudence is confusing and conflated. 323 In particular, the Court has a difficult time
determining: (1) what constitutes a penalty to the right to travel, 324 (2) what constitutes basic
necessities of life, 325 and (3) the proper constitutional test to apply to classifications that penalize
the right to travel. 326 From a practical point of view, as Nzelibe argues, a court would probably
analyze a fundamental rights claim involving the right to travel 327 using an ad-hoc balancing test
that measures the amount of penalty involved in the state action. 328
States do not explicitly discriminate between motor vehicle and non-motor vehicle users,
and generally do not enact laws that preclude citizens from driving motor vehicles that are
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outside the scope of valid exercises of the police power. 329 Any citizen can drive a car if they
can afford it -- regardless of whether they happen to be a new resident or a visitor of a state. In
order to find the right to travel “penalized,” a court would have to hold that the high cost of
owning an automobile is a penalty per se, and possibly that the right to intrastate travel exists.
Given the large catalogue of jurisprudence that does not protect an individual’s right to use
particular travel modes, courts seem unlikely to protect non-motor vehicle users under the
fundamental rights rubric by itself. Nevertheless, defining the right to travel as fundamental
might help define the contours of a suspect class of poor people for the purposes of challenging
the lack of transportation options under equal protection.
Under the Supreme Court’s equal protection doctrine of total deprivation, 330 poor
individuals could make the claim that they cannot afford a motor vehicle and are thus totally
deprived of transportation mobility. If a “total deprivation” argument were combined with a
right to travel claim, the Supreme Court would be faced with an argument that is very similar to
its prior cases. 331 The grouping of poor people as a suspect class provides the discrimination
required to bring the claim that state action penalizes the fundamental right to travel. And if a
court recognizes a right to intrastate travel, non-motor vehicle users would have a cause of action
even if they were not engaging in acts traditionally protected under interstate travel
jurisprudence. 332 If the right to intrastate travel exists, non-motor vehicle users operating
completely within a state could also receive constitutional protection.
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The total deprivation doctrine reached fruition in San Antonio Independent School
District v. Rodriguez, where poor citizens in Texas challenged the state’s school funding
system. 333 The Supreme Court rejected the claim, and held that no federal fundamental right to
education exists. 334 However, the Court also stated, “[t]he individuals, or groups of individuals,
who constituted the class discriminated against in our prior cases shared two distinguishing
characteristics: because of their impecunity they were completely unable to pay for some desired
benefit, and as a consequence, they sustained an absolute deprivation of a meaningful
opportunity to enjoy that benefit.” 335 Crucial to the Court’s factual analysis was the fact that the
people impacted did not show they were indigent or beneath “any designated poverty level.” 336
San Antonio also reasoned that no constitutional violation occurs when the state creates an
adequate substitute for the desired benefit. 337
This language opened the door for future Equal Protection Clause suspect classification
claims based on total deprivation due to poverty. Under the total deprivation doctrine, even if
the state classification is rationally related to a state interest, the court must find that the state
action satisfies strict scrutiny. 338 To date, however, this author is not aware of any case that has
invoked the total deprivation doctrine in the context of the right to travel.

332
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The total deprivation standard laid out in San Antonio is extremely hard to meet. The
Court’s general rule for equal protection claims holds that “[i]f a legislative classification or
distinction neither burdens a fundamental right nor targets a suspect class, we will uphold [it] so
long as it bears a rational relation to some legitimate end.” 339 The lack of wealth, in and of
itself, does not create a suspect classification for the purposes of the Equal Protection Clause. 340
Indeed, the Supreme Court “has held repeatedly that poverty, standing alone, is not a suspect
classification.” 341 The key difference in the transportation context, versus a standard poverty
claim involving equal protection, is that the right to travel implicates both the total deprivation
doctrine (and thus a suspect classification) and the fundamental right to travel. Together, a total
deprivation/right to travel argument fuses the various strands of transportation jurisprudence and
demonstrates that a penalty has occurred that infringes the right to travel. Total deprivation and
right to travel arguments combine notions of individual liberty in cases like Williams v. Fears 342
and freedom of movement jurisprudence 343 with the broader notions of class protection evident
in many of the interstate and intrastate travel cases.
Abundant evidence exists to show that increasing numbers of poor Americans are totally
deprived of the right to travel. 344 The primary transportation engineering manual in the United
States puts the needs of motor vehicles squarely ahead of alternative forms of transportation. 345
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For decades, transportation policy focused on enabling motor vehicle use at the expense of other
transportation modes. 346 Large numbers of people below the poverty line are unable to flee from
natural disasters, and these individuals tend to be African American. 347 The average cost of
operating a motor vehicle is now over $8000 per year. 348 The average individual on welfare
cannot afford a car, and less than half of all jobs in the United States are accessible by public
transportation. 349
These overwhelming facts appear to satisfy the total deprivation doctrine laid out in San
Antonio. Many of the poor individuals that need transportation access are below the poverty
line, they have no adequate replacement for the desired benefit in the form of public
transportation, and they suffer from a total deprivation of significant portions of the
transportation system. Seen through this lens, the total deprivation doctrine avoids the problems
associated with a stand-alone fundamental rights analysis involving the right to travel, 350 and
remains faithful to the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence that protects the travel rights of poorer
members of society.
Could a state justify state action that limits non-motor vehicle use under a total
deprivation challenge? This remains an open question, and by no means an easy one. A
reviewing court could apply intermediate scrutiny to intrastate travel litigation 351 or strict
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scrutiny to interstate travel cases. 352 As in Lutz, a court might easily find that restrictions on
automobiles are a significant state interest.353 However, in the context of poverty and lack of
mobility, a court could also easily find that deprivation of transportation access can not be
justified by policy arguments — particularly when public transportation, bicycling, and walking
accommodation exist as feasible solutions. In the end, courts will have to decide whether the
transportation rights involved are significant enough to be considered “penalties” that warrant
interference with legislative policy decisions.
It will probably remain true that a rich man will drive in a limousine, while a poor man
will have to walk. Nevertheless, the total deprivation doctrine of the Equal Protection Clause
offers a legitimate pathway towards protecting the rights of poor individuals to walk, bicycle,
and use public transportation. The Supreme Court’s repeated protection of poorer individuals’
travel rights indicates that total deprivation claims have a significant likelihood of success. 354
Non-automobile users finally have the vehicle they need to achieve a balanced transportation
system. 355
This Comment has endeavored to show that some forms of transportation do not have to
be more equal than others. While the Monarch decision and its progeny suggest the nonexistence of a constitutional right to use a particular travel mode, Supreme Court case law
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remains sympathetic to a person with no travel options. 356 Neither the Supreme Court, nor the
lower courts, has considered a case where an individual, either by choice or because of poverty,
literally has no way of reaching a destination absent a motor vehicle. Considering the general
state of the transportation infrastructure in the United States, particularly in rural areas, it is
certainly possible to imagine such a scenario. 357 If such a case ever does wind its way through
the courts, ample Supreme Court and lower court case law exists to maintain that an individual
does have a right to reach a destination, at least through an inexpensive and reasonable means
like bicycling or walking. In sum, the constitutional right to travel, combined with the total
deprivation doctrine under the Equal Protection Clause, can help reverse America’s addiction to
the automobile.
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